This paper shows that Popper's measure of corroboration is inapplicable if, as Popper also argued, the logical probability of synthetic universal statements is zero relative to any evidence that we might possess. It goes on to show that Popper's definition of degree of testability, in terms of degree of logical content, suffers from a similar problem.
Popper's views on the significance of corroboration underwent change throughout his career. For more detail, see Rowbottom [2010] , Sections 2.4-2.5.3. 2 In his own words, this is 'probability relative to some evidence; that is to say, relative to a singular statement, or to a finite conjunction of singular statements' (ibid.) Put simply, the idea is that infinitely many theories will be compatible with those observation statements and that those theories must be assigned equal probabilities. See Rowbottom [2010] , Section 2.3.
In short, the central term on the denominator of (1), which is present for the purposes of normalization, is defunct. But (4) has various features that render it unsuitable as a function for measuring corroboration; chiefly, it doesn't even provide a suitable ordering of how well theories have fared in response to testing. Compare two scenarios in which e is found to be true, the first in which P ℎ = 1 and P = 0.1, and the second in which P ℎ = 0.1 and P = 0.01. According to (4), h is equally corroborated, i.e. has a corroboration value of 9/11, in each scenario. 3 This is patently absurd, however, since in the former scenario e is entailed by h and b (and discovery of ~e would have falsified the conjunct), whereas in the latter scenario h makes no notable contribution to predicting e in the presence of b (and discovery of ~e would hardly have been a blow for h and b).
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But can b contain something other than a finite number of observation statements, and in a way such that (2) is sometimes false? First, I take it that we cannot possess infinitely many observation statements. Second, since (1) cannot concern a test of h if h is entailed by b, for the simple reason that h would make no predictions above and beyond b, we must conclude that P ℎ < 1 whenever (1) In short, the worry is that if Popper's argument that the probability of h relative to any finite number of observation statements is zero is successful, then it also shows that the probability of h relative to any infinite number of observation statements predicted by some theory (such as those implied by Newtonian mechanics) is zero when those only cover a limited range. View h as a curve. Consider observation statements-feel free to imagine if liked, as it makes no difference in the present context, that these are infallible-to be points on the curve. For any finite number of points, there are infinitely many curves that pass through. Now consider an infinite number of observation statements but only in a peculiar variable range. Here we will have a segment (or segments) of the curve h, but infinitely many curves contain this segment (or these segments). Thus if the argument for the logical probability of h being zero works for finitely many observations, it works for infinitely many observations (or assumed-to-be-correct predictions) when these are in a limited range.
6 And if they aren't in a limited range, recall, then they will either entail h or conflict with h. But as we have seen above, (1) Perhaps there are other relevant items that could be placed in b*? One idea, for instance, might be to introduce assumptions related to theoretical virtues, such as 'The simplest theory compatible with b is the most likely to be true'. Yet even if we assume that we have an appropriate measure of relative virtuosity-in this example, of simplicity-this strategy appears to go against the spirit of an anti-inductivist stance in the philosophy of science, and to question the relevance of Popper's argument for (2) in the first place. If we are free to help ourselves to this kind of assumption, then we will find that finitely many observation statements can grant high probabilities to theories. 'Prefer the simplest theories available which are compatible with the evidence' may indeed be a methodological rule for Popper, but this is far from suggesting that simplicity is a guide to truth or falsity (and therefore that 6 Naturally the fact that observations are only made within some error range means that matters are worse than suggested here; in short, we do not have access to a segment but only a range of possible segments within the error bars. 7 Donald Gillies suggested, in correspondence, that if we allow h to be a model rather than a theory (on a syntactic view of theories), e.g. of the Moon's motion, and then b* may be understood to contain theories used in its construction, e.g. Newtonian mechanics, in a non-problematic fashion. This is an interesting idea, but would only work in limited contexts where two incompatible theories (such as Newtonian mechanics and relativity) were not being compared. Furthermore, it would constitute a departure from the Popperian emphasis on theory, and not merely model, testing.
with the class of its potential falsifiers, in a variety of fashions. He arrives at the following thesis:
In comparing degrees of testability or of empirical content we shall… as a rule -i.e. in the case of purely empirical statements -arrive as the same results as in comparing logical content, or derivability relations. (Popper [1959] , p. 121)
We should consider Popper's comments about the measure 1 − P ℎ in this light. As we have seen above, he equates the measure both to 'degree of testability'
and 'the content of h relative to b' (Popper [1983] , p. 241). The content in question here is presumably logical, in so far the measure is defined in terms of logical probability; i.e. 1 − P ℎ is supposed to be a measure of the logical 'content of h relative to b' (ibid.) Thus it is plausible that Popper has the following thesis in mind:
Degree of empirical content of h relative to b is equal to degree of logical content of h relative to b.
Even if this is wrong, and Popper does not think ($) is true, he writes of
'degree of testability or of empirical content' (Popper [1959] , p. 121) and states that 1 − P ℎ is also equal to 'degree of testability' (Popper [1983] , p. 241). 9 Hence he thinks that:
(£) Degree of empirical content of h relative to b is equal to
In his own words: 'corroborability equals testability and empirical content' (Popper [1983] , p. 245) [emphasis in original] . But if the logical probability of "All swans are white or black" is equal to the logical probability of "All swans are white"
9 It is also possible that Popper was defending a somewhat weaker theory than ($):
(¥) Degree of empirical content of h relative to b is < / = / > degree of empirical content of h* relative to b* iff degree of logical content of h relative to b is < / = / > degree of logical content of h* relative to b*.
Thanks to Tim Williamson for drawing this to my attention.
(relative to b), then the degree of empirical content of each is equal (relative to b) on such a view. And each is a universal hypothesis, so each does have the same logical probability (relative to b), namely zero, on the argument which led us to reject (1).
Hence (£) is false if degree of empirical content is to be thought of in terms of potential falsifiers. (The potential falsifiers for "All swans are white or black" are a proper subset of the potential falsifiers for "All swans are white".) Derivatively, ($) is also false if degree of logical content is defined as 1 − P ℎ .
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One could resist this conclusion only by insisting that degree of empirical content is a coarse-grained measure, such that degree of empirical content of h may be equal to degree of empirical content of h* even when the potential falsifiers of one are a proper subset of the potential falsifiers of the other. But to defend (£) in such a way leads to a dilemma. It forces renunciation either of the claim that degree of testability is equivalent to degree of empirical content or of the claim that different universal hypotheses can have different degrees of testability (given that each universal hypothesis has the same logical probability). Popper would not have wanted to suggest that "All swans are red or orange or yellow or green or blue or violet or white or black" is generally as good (qua testable) a hypothesis as "All swans are white", so
would not have grasped the second horn. To grasp the first, however, gives rise to the question "In virtue of what, if not greater empirical content, is 'All swans are white' more testable than 'All swans are red or orange or… white or black'?" The difficulty of arriving at a satisfactory answer strongly suggests that rejecting (£), and avoiding the dilemma altogether, would be a preferable option. Then, to repeat, ($) must be rejected too.
